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Financing vs. Forgiving A Debt Overhang
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the tradeoffs facing creditors of a country whose
debt is large enough that the country cannot attract voluntary new lending.
If the country is unable to meet its debt service requirements out of current
income, the creditors have two choices. They can finance the country, lending
at an expected loss in the hope that the country will eventually be able to
repay its debt after all; or they can forgive, reducing the debt level to one
that the country can repay. The post-1983 debt strategy of the IMF and the US
has relied on financing, but many current calls for debt reform call for
forgiveness instead.
The paper shows that the choice between financing and forgiveness
represents a tradeoff. Financing gives the creditors an option value: if the
country turns out to do relatively well, creditors will not have written down
their claims unnecessarily. However, the burden of debt distorts the
country's incentives, since the benefits of good performance go largely to
creditors rather than itself.
The paper also shows that the tradeoff itself can be improved if both
financing and forgiveness are made contingent on states of nature that the
country cannot affect, such as oil prices, world interest rates, etc.
Paul Krugman




(617)868-3900Discussion of new approaches to the developing country debt
problem is more intense now than at any time since 1983. Some
proposals, such as the Baker initiative, involve revitalization
and continuation of the 1983 strategy of financing without either
debt forgiveness or change in the nature of claims. Other
proposals, such as the Bradley Plan, call for major debt
forgiveness in an effort to clear the books and restore normal
conditions. In between are a variety of proposals for changing the
character of the relations between debtors and creditors,
including interest capitalization,lending or debt relief
contingent on world prices, conversion of debt into equity or
equity-like claims, and so on.
Somewhat surprisingly, this practical discussion is taking
place with little parallel analytical discussion among economists.
While there is a fairly substantial theoretical literature on the
problem of sovereign risk (survey-ed by Eaton, Gersovitz, and
Stiglitz(1986)), the bulk of this literature has focussed either
on the case of creditor rationing of a country that is borrowing
with no existing debt, or the choice by a country whether to repay
or default. The position in the real world, however, is one of
both repayment and new borrowing; countries have arrived in the
1current situation with a stock of "inherited" debt, which they
cannot fully service without new borrowing. If the countries'
future repayment were not in doubt, they would have no difficulty
in borrowing to service existing debt, but for a group of large
debtors doubt about future repayment is sufficient that only
through extraordinary measures have creditors been induced to
provide new money.
Now there does exist a small theoretical literature that
bears on the actual debt problem fairly closely. This is the
literature on the problems posed by a debt overhang. By a debt
overhang I mean the presence of an existing, "inherited" debt
sufficiently large that creditors do not expect with confidence to
be fully repaid. The effects of such a debt overhang have been
analyzed in only a few papers, including Sachs (1984,1986) and
Krugman (l985a,1985b). These papers have shown that the presence
of a debt overhang may give creditors an incentive to lend at an
expected loss to protect their existing claims (Sachs 1984;
Krugman 1985a, 1985b). It also shows that there may be a conflict
between creditors' individual and collective interest, and that
free rider problems may compromise the ability to achieve
desirable new lending. On the other hand, the incentives of a
debtor may be distorted by the presence of a debt overhang, and
the distortion will be reduced if creditors provide immediate debt
2forgiveness rather than providing new money and hoping for more
favorable future conditions (Sachs 1986). The debt overhang
approach is highly suggestive of the desirability of innovative
approaches to the provision of funds, and perhaps of changes in
the nature of bank claims on developing countries.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a synthetic
presentation of the debt overhang analysis that, although
abstract, may help clarify ideas for practical discussion. The
first part of the paper sketches out three examples that are
intended to convey some of the key issues. The second part of the
paper presents a more formal model that focusses on the tradeoff
between new lending and debt forgiveness as ways of coping with a
debt overhang. The third part then examines how changing the
nature of claims might help resolution of a debt overhang.
fldebtoverhang problem: some illustrative examples.
A debtor country is something like a debtor firm, although
the parallel is not exact. At any given time, the creditors of a
firm view that firm as having a probability distribution over
streams of future earnings, out of which debt service can be paid.
If the present value of the stream of earnings is expected to be
less than the firm's debt, then creditors will not expect to be
3fully repaid -- althoughthey may prefer to wait and see rather
than force the firm immediately into bankruptcy proceedings.
A country, like a firm, has an expected stream of earnings,
but not all of this stream is potentially available to service
debt. Instead, some fraction of national income represents the
maximum resource transfer that the country can be induced to make.
Loosely, we can think of the expected stream of potential resource
transfers from a country to its creditors as analogous to the
expected stream of earnings of a firm.
Now the analogy is less than exact, because the potential
resource transfer from a country to its creditors is not really a
fixed number. Instead, the maximum level of resource transfer is
determined ultimately by the country's willingness to pay, which
in turn reflects both rational calculations of the cost of default
and internal political considerations. There is a bargaining
problem between creditors, who would like to get the most possible
out of a country, and the country, which would like to minimize
resource transfer. Some progress has been made on the bargaining
issue, for example by Bulow and Rogoff (1986). However, it is
useful for analytical purposes to put this bargaining issue aside,
and imagine that the rate of resource transfer that is possible at
any point in time is a well-defined number (although perhaps
uncertain ex ante).
4If we grant ourselves the enormous simplification of taking
maximum resource transfer as given, we are left with a
straightforward definition of the problem of debt overhang.
country has a debt overhang problem whenthe expected present value
of potential future resource transfers is less than its debt.
To illustrate the implications of debt overhang, I will
consider three highly stylized examples of the problems that such
overhang can cause. The three examples share a common structure,
in which the action takes two periods. In the first period a
country starts with an inherited debt, all of which (for
simplicity) is due during that period. The country attempts to pay
that debt with resource transfer plus new borrowing. The new
borrowing, in turn, must be repaid with resource transfer in the
second period.
What happens if a country is unable to repay fully at the
end? For the moment, I will ignore the problem of costs of default
and assume that creditors simply share the maximum resource
transfer the country can make. Thus if the country is unable to
repay fully in the second period, the result is effectively that
part of the debt is forgiven. This shifts the emphasis to the
first period. The key question is whether the country will
experience a liquidity crisis. Will the country be able to attract
new borrowing in order to service its inherited debt? This depends
5on the behavior of lenders. I will assume that lenders are risk
neutral, and face a given opportunity cost of funds on world
markets. An important question is whether creditors are purely
competitive or can operate collusively in their joint interest. We
will consider both cases.
Debt overhang without uncertainty
Consider first the situation where there is no uncertainty,
i.e. ,thepotential resource transfers in period 1 and 2 are
known from the beginning. We assume that all of the debt comes due
in period 1, with required debt repayment D; the resource transfer
possible in each period is x1, x2. We let i be the opportunity
cost of funds to lenders.
Does this country have a liquidity problem? The country can
make repayment of debt equal to x1 out of current resources; if
current debt service exceeds this amount, it must engage in new
borrowing equal to D-x1. Lenders will supply this voluntarily at
their opportunity cost i if they believe that they will be fully
repaid, as they indeed will provided that (l+i)(D -x1)< x2, or,
equivalently, if x1 +x2/(l+i)
>D.Not surprisingly, there will
be no problem of liquidity if the present value of potential
resource transfer exceeds the inherited debt.
6Suppose on the other hand thatx1 +x2/(1-1-i)<D.Then the
country will not be able to meet its debt service. It certainly
cannot borrow the needed resources D -atthe safe rate, since
it will be seen to be unable torepay its loans in full. Nor can
it attract additional lending by offering an interestrate above
the safe rate. The total resources available for debtrepayment in
period 2 are x2, with a present value ofx2/(l÷i). Regardless of
the interest rate on period 1 loans, that is what creditorswill
get, and it is less than the value of the necessary loans.
Thus the best that the initial creditors can do is reacha
settlement with the country that immediately reduces thecountry's
obligations. The mechanics of the settlement are, at this level of
abstraction, arbitrary.Any combinationofrescheduling,
forgiveness of principal, forgiveness of interest, and new lending
at concessional rates will do as long as it brings the actual
resource transfer in line with what is possible.
In the absence of uncertainty, then, the problem of whatto
do about debt overhang would be straightforward. If thecountry
can pay, there will be no liquidity problem. If itcannot, the
debt must be written down at the outset.
Debt overhang with uncertainty
Now consider a country that similarly has inheriteda debt D,
7but faces an uncertain future. Either because the world economic
environment is uncertain, or because the country's own economic
performance cannot be predicted, the potential resource transfer
in period 2 is a random variable. To keep things simple, we
suppose that first period resource transfer is a known value x1,
while in the second period the maximum transfer will take on only
one of two values, XG (good case) or x (bad case). In the bad
case, the present value of potential resource transfer will be
less than the initial debt, while in the good case it may be
possible that the debt can be repaid.
Is this country solvent? This is not a well-defined question.
Unless the present value of resource transfer is less than the
debt in both states, it is simply unknown whether the country can
earn enough to repay its debt. However,we can ask whether the
country will have a liquidity problem, and here there is a
straightforward answer: it will be able to borrow to service its
debt if and only if the expected present value of the resource
transfer is at least as great as the debt.
To see this, let p be the probability of a good outcome, i-p
be the probability of a bad outcome. What we want to ask is
whether there is an interest rate that the country can offer that
will induce lenders to supply the resources L —D-
x1that are
necessary to allow debt service. Suppose that the country offers
8an interest rate r on its new borrowing such that L(l+r)
X.
This is the highest interest rate that makessense, since the
country cannot even in the best case pay more than this. Then
lenders will receive all of the potential resource transfer in
either state. The expected present value of their receipts will be
[pxc + (l-p)xB]/(1+i). They will be induced to lend if this
exceeds the necessary lending D -x1.But the condition [px +
(l-p)xB]/(l+i) > D-x is simply the condition that the expected
present value of resource transfer exceed the value of the
inherited debt.
As long as this criterion is satisfied, the country will be
able to borrow enough to service its debt simply by paying a
sufficiently high interest premium. If it is not satisfied, the
country will not be able to attract voluntary borrowing, and will
thus be unable to service its debt.
Now if that were that, we would simply see a default whenever
financial markets view a country as having less future ability to
pay than its existing debt. However, it is in the interest of
existing creditors to prevent this. Even without any explicit
modelling of how a liquidity crisis is played out, it seems
obvious that the creditors are not likely to collect the full
potential resource transfer from the country if there is a
disorderly default.Let Z be the present value of what creditors
9expect to be able to collect from a country if there is a
liquidity crisis in period 1; it seems safe to assume that Z < x1
+[pxc+(lp)xBJ/(l4i)< D. Yet it is not necessary that
creditors accept the certainty of loss. Suppose that they are able
to relend enough to the debtor to avert default in period 1, and
postpone the reckoning until period 2. Then if they are lucky,
they may receive full repayment after all; while if they are
unlucky, they will still be better off than if they had allowed a
default to take place immediately.
We can easily construct a strategy that will achieve this
aim. Let the existing creditors relend the country L =D-
x1at
an interest rate such that L(l+r) =x.Then the creditors will
receive all of the potential second period resource transfer in
either state. Viewed in isolation, this will still be a losing
proposition: the expected present value of their receipts will be
[pxG +(lp)xB]/(l+i)<L.Thus no lender would voluntarily enter
the package if she had no stake in the repayment of the original
debt. From the point of view of the initial creditors, however, a
lending package insures that they receive the full present value
of the country's potential resource transfer, which is more than
they would get without the lending. Thus lending that would be
unprofitable viewed in isolation is worth doing as a way of
defending the value of existing debt.
10There are several points worth noting about this kind of
defensive lending scenario, since even this simple an example is
enough to show that several commonly held beliefs about debt
problems are incorrect.
First, much discussion about the debt problem tries to make a
clear distinction between liquidity and solvency, with the
argument being that new lending to cover debt service is
appropriate for liquidity but not for solvency problems. Even this
simple schematic approach makes clear, however,that the
distinction is not useful. If we knew that the country could repay
the full present value of its debt -- oreven if the expected
value of potential payments were large enough -- thecountry could
attract voluntary lending by offering a sufficiently high interest
premium. The inability to attract funds comes because the expected
ability to pay is too low; a liquidity crisis must occur because
of doubts about solvency. As we have just seen, however, the
expectation of insolvency does not prevent new lending from being
in the interest of existing creditors.
Second, some commentators have pointed to the large discounts
at which developing country debt sells on secondary markets as
evidence that further lending is inappropriate. Clearly in this
model new lending to the debtor would immediately sell at a
discount, since it has an expected present value less than the
11value of the lending. The discount is just another aspect of the
fact that the new lending is unprofitable viewed in isolation. The
point is, however, that it is still worth doing beacuse it does
not take place in isolation; it is essential to the repayment of
existing debt.
Third, we have seen that it is in the interests of existing
creditors to relend enough to avoid an immediate default on the
part of the country. However, it is only in their .collective.
interest. Any individual.creditor would be better off if it could
opt out of the new lending and let other creditors carry the
burden. Thus we have the free rider problem emphasized by Cline
(1983) and many others. This free rider problem could lead to a
liquidity crisis even though this is not in anyone's interest.
Fourth, we often ask whether or not the new lending that
takes place to debtors is at concessionary terms or not. The
standard usually used is a comparison with market interest rates.
However, the example makes it clear that the market rate
comparison is essentially irrelevant. From the point of view of
the lenders, the loans yield an expected return less than the
market rate, whatever the face interest rate; thus they will view
this as lending at concessional terms. Whether the interest rate
on the loan is more or less than their opportunity cost of funds
depends on how favorable the good state is. The interest they
12charge is defined by the relationship L(l+r) =
XG.The rate r will
exceed i if xG/(l+i) > D-x1, be less than i if xG/(l+i) <
that is, on whether even in the good state the present value of
resource transfer exceeds the opportunity cost of funds.
This last observation raises a puzzle. The example suggests
that if there is y state in which the present value of resource
transfer exceeds the value of existing debt, the interest rate
charged by creditors on new lending should exceed their
opportunity cost of funds. Presumably for most debtors there is at
least the possibility of such a favorable state; even Bolivia
might discover a valuable, unsuspected natural resource. Yet this
description of creditor behavior seems both wrong in practice and
disturbing; isn't there any circumstance under which new lending
(or rescheduling of existing debt) will take place at concessional
rates? To develop any motivation for debt forgiveness, we need to
have an example in which creditors have to be concerned about the
incentives they give the debtor.
Incentive effects
In the last example, creditors have an incentive to lend to
the debtor, even at an expected loss, as a way to defend the value
of their existing claims. However, their incentive is to lend at
the highest interest rate that could be paid, even in the most
13favorable state of nature; only in this way can they insure that
they collect the maximum resource transfer from the country. In
effect, while the creditors are taking an expected loss, they will
have an incentive to provide financial relief to the country
entirely through new money rather than through interest rate
reduction. Indeed, as long as there is any state of nature in
which the present value of resource transfer exceeds the value of
inherited debt, the creditors will charge an interest rate that is
higher than their opportunity cost of funds.
In order to soften this result, we need to take into
consideration the effect of the debt burden on the incentives
facing the debtor. In the real world there are a variety of
actions that debtors can take which affect their future ability to
make resource transfers: exchange rate adjustment, investment,
budget policies, and so on. Let us summarize these policies under
the vague heading of "adjustment effort". Then creditors will want
a country to make as much adjustment effort as possible, certainly
more than the country would like to undertake. Now suppose that
the debt burden on a country is as large as the maximum that the
country could possibly pay, even with maximum adjustment effort.
Then there is in fact no reason for the country to make the
adjustment effort, since the reward goes only to its creditors. It
makes sense, therefore, for the creditors to demand less than this
14maximum, in order to provide the creditor with some incentive to
adjust.
For our third example, we consider the extreme case where the
potential resource transfer depends only on the action of the
debtor, and not at all on the state of nature (this is the case
considered by Sachs (1986)). In period 1, as always, there is a
debt service requirement D and a known maximum resource transfer
x1. Creditors thus must lend D-x1 to prevent a liquidity crisis.
In the second period, however, the potential resource transfer
depends on the adjustment effort. If the adjustment effort is
high, maximum resource transfer is xH; if it is low, xL. Other
things equal, the debtor would prefer to make the lower adjustment
effort.
The maximum interest rate that could conceivably be paid is
defined by L(l+r) =x.fl.If the creditors charge this interest
rate, however, the debtor will have no incentive to make the high
adjustment effort. It may thus be in the interest of creditors to
charge an interest rate sufficiently low that the debtor makes the
higher adjustment effort. If there is a liquidity problem, and no
uncertainty, the optimal interest rate in the absence of
uncertainty must be one that is below the market rate i.
Several observations follow from this example. First, we note
that charging an interest rate that is below the maximum resource
15transfer and below the market rate is actually in the interest of
the creditors. If we compare the value of their claims with the
optimal interest rate with the value with a higher interest rate,
we will find that reducing the face value of loans actually raises
their market value.
Second, this example suggests both the motivation for
conditionality and the problems of enforcing it. The creditors
would like to impose a requirement for high adjustment as a
condition for the loan -- inwhich case the interest rate could be
higher. On the other hand, the threat not to lend if the country
fails to act correctly may be hard to establish credibly, since it
remains in the interest of the creditors to avoid provoking a
liquidity crisis.
Third, while debt forgiveness may be desirable from the point
of view of creditors as a way of creating incentives, it is
clearly a blunt instrument for this purpose. The example
immediately suggests that loans are the wrong form of claim; some
form of contingent claim would be preferable. (The specification
of the optimal claim is left to the more elaborate discussion
below).
We have now gone about as far as we can with simple examples.
In order to integrate the insights from these examples, we now
turn to a formal model.
162. A formal model of debt overhang
As in the simplified examples, we consider a country that has
inherited a stock of debt D, all of it due in the first of two
periods. In period 1 the country can make a known maximum resource
transfer x1. In period 2 the country's resource transfer potential
is unknown, so that
(1) x2s+z
where s is a random variable that ranges from s to s and z isa
choice variable capturing the concept of "adjustment effort"by
the debtor country.
The country is assumed to care about two things: the level of
resources left to it in the second period, and the size of the
adjustment effort it is required to make. Let C2 be the difference
between the country's potential resource transferx2 and the
actual payment it must make to creditors:
(2) C2 =x2
-P
For simplicity, and to avoid mixing insurance issues into our





where the function v(z) captures the dislike of the country for
making adjustments that enlarge its future ability to pay
creditors.
Suppose that the creditors are able to overcome the free
rider problems we mentioned in the previous section and lend
enough to avert default in the first period. Then it follows that
first period lending will be equal to the difference between
maximum potential debt service and the value of the debt,
(4) L =D-
Supposethat the creditors have charged an interest rate r on
their new lending. If potential resource transfer exceeds L(l+r),
the loan will be repaid in full. If it does not, we assume that
the creditors will receive the maximum possible, so that
(5) P =x2if x2 <L(l-i-r)
=L(l+r)if x2 > L(l+r)
18We can now think of this as a game in which the creditors
fir;t choose the interest rate, then the debtor chooses the level
of adjustment effort. To solve this game, we first solve the
debtor's problem conditional on the interest rate. From (3) and
(5) we derive the expected utility of the country:
(6) EU J[(s+z) -L(l+r)]f(s)ds-v(z)
L(l+r)-z
An increase in the adjustment effort z raises the resources
of the country in favorable states when it does not have to pay
all of its potential resource transfer to the creditors, but is
costly in and of itself:
(7) 8EU/Bz = Jf(s)ds
-v'(z)
L(l+r) -z
If the effort level has an interior maximum, we must have ÔEU/8z=O
and 32EU/3z2 < 0, where
(8) 32EU/3z2 =f[L(l+r)-z]-v''(z)
We now want to calculate the response of adjustment effort to




Then we use the implicit function theorem to derive the
response
(10) dz/dr Lf[L(1+r) -z]/(32EU/8z2)<0
Thus the higher the interest rate, the lower the country's
adjustment effort.
The objective of the creditors is to maximize the expected








This condition clearly indicates the two motives facing the
creditors. The first term, which is always positive, is the
20"new-money" bias imparted by the presence of uncertainty. Since
something may always turn up that allows the debtor to pay more
than you expected, creditors have an incentive to roll over debt
at as high an interest rate as possible in order to be able to
benefit from good news. The second term, which is alwaysnegative,
represents the "debt forgiveness" bias imparted by the problem of
incentives for the debtor. Creditors do not want to make the
country's situation too hopeless, or it will have no incentive to
improve its ability to repay.
If the situation were dominated only by one or the other
consideration, the choice between new money and debt forgiveness
would be clear. If uncertainty were the only issue, it would
always be best for creditors to finance but not forgive, so as to
preserve the option of cashing in on unexpected good fortune. If
incentives were the only issue, it would on the contrary be best
for creditors to take their loss up front so that it does not act
as a prohibitive tax on debtors' effort. Unfortunately, in reality
both issues are present, so that the choice of the rightstrategy
is not an easy one.
The dilemma presented by this tradeoff, however, is not
inescapable. It is due to the fact that both new money and debt
forgiveness are rather blunt instruments for dealing with the
problem of debt overhang. Can an innovative repayment scheme, one
21that effectively changes the nature of claims, do better? In
principle, at least, it can.
3. Changing the nature claims
A number of proposals have been advanced for converting debt
into some other kind of claim. The proposals range from piecemeal
debt-equity conversions, to Bailey's (1982) proposal to convert
debt to proportional claims on exports, to proposals that either
interest rates or new lending be indexed automatically to prices
of exports. The approach taken inthis paper cannot do justice to
the details of such schemes, since it treats the real economy as a
"black box" out of which resources are somehow extracted.
Nonetheless, it is possible to capture some of the spirit of
innovative proposals by considering schemes in which the required
repayment depends on the size of the potential resource transfer.
We may divide proposals to change the nature of claims into
two broad classes. First are schemes that link repayment to some
general measure of ability to repay. The best-known examples are
proposals that debt repayment beproportional to export revenues.
The key point about these schemes is that they make no distinction
between favorable results due to national effort and those due to
factors outside the nation's control. On the other side are
22proposals to link repayment to some measure of the shocks
experienced by a country, such as the level of world interest
rates or the price of the country's principal export good. These
two kinds of proposal are quite different at least in principle.
There is a further distinction within these proposals between
debt postponement and debt forgiveness. Most proposals that link
repayment either to ability to pay or to the state of nature do
not, at least on paper, reduce the eventual obligation of a
country to pay: the obligation is simply rescheduled, at market
interest rates, into the future. However, it will be easier
analytically to imagine that what is at stake is immediate debt
forgiveness. We can then ask whether debt postponement is similar
in its implications.
Repayment linked to ability to repay
Suppose that we have a country exactly like that described in
the previous section, but the its creditors take an innovative
approach to its problem. Instead of lending it the money needed to
service its debt, they establish a claim that varies with the
ability to repay. We can approximate such a scheme by supposing
that repayment is a function of second-period potential resource
transfer:
23(13)P—A+Bx2 O<B<l
Does such a scheme resolve creditors' conflict between taking
advantage of good news and providing debtors with an incentive to
adjust? Unfortunately, it does not. Consider the first-order
condition of the debtor. Given the repayment schedule, the
difference between potential and actual resource transfer will be
(14) C2-A +(l-B)x2
Thus the debtor will maximize
(15) EU =f[-A +(l-B)(s+z)Jf(s)ds -v(z)
with the first-order condition
(16) 8EU/3z =(1-B)
-v'(z)=0
This condition may be interpreted as follows: the country receives
only a fraction (1-B) of the benefit from any improvement in its
resource transfer capacity. There is a tradeoff in substituting a
24claim contingent on ability to repay for a simple loan: it isno
longer the case that in bad states of natureextra adjustment
effort provides no benefit to the debtor, but the benefit it
receives in good states is diluted. It is unclear without a
detailed model of the economy which will distort incentives more.
This analysis shows that proposals to linkrepayment to
exports or other measures of capacity to repay do not eliminate
the problem of incentives, and therefore do not eliminate the
tradeoff between new money and debt forgiveness. Notice, however,
that while this is the only issue that can be addressed in the
stylized framework presented here,in practiceexchange
participation notes or other schemes might still be valuable for
other reasons, for example as a way to allow debt service to rise
over time in line with economic growth and inflation.
Payment linked to the state ofnature
The alternative class of proposal would linkrepayment to
sonicmeasureof the state of nature. An ideal measure would
separate perfectly between the consequences of the country's
effort and events outside its control; it is easiest to
concentrate our formal analysis on this case, then discuss how the
imperfection of real measures affects the argument.
25In the context of our formal model, the form of an optimal
scheme is obvious: it would appropriate all of the gains that
result from the state of nature s, but none of the consequences of
the effort level z:
(17) P A +s
The resulting first-order condition will be
(18) 3EU/Bz 1 -v'(z)0
Thus the distortion in the country's incentive to adjust is
completely eliminated.
For the creditors, the degree of freedom in the scheme would
be in setting the constant term A. At first glance, it might seem
that the creditors could set A equal to the optimal z, so that
they would provide the debtor witha marginal incentive to adjust
yet in the end capture all of the debtor's potential resource
transfer by the debtor. This may look too clever to be real, and
it is. In addition to satisfying the marginal conditon (18), the
debtor's choice of adjustment effort must be globally optimal. If
there is no gain from adjusting, the debtor will be better off
choosing its own preferred level of effort and simply defaulting
26on the payment scheme (17). Thus the expected resource transfer
that can be extracted from the country will be limited by the need
to provide enough incentive for the country to participate in the
debt initiative. This constraint is not, however, unique to
state-contingent schemes. The only unique feature is that a
perfect state-contingent sheme would extract from the country less
than its maximum reasource transfer in all states of nature, even
the least favorable.
It is clear from the analysis that an ideal state-contingent
scheme should be able to do better than either a simple loan that
will probably not be repaid in full or a claim linked to broad
ability to repay. In reality, of course, a scheme will be less
than ideal, if only because the state of nature cannot be fully
specified. For example, repayment might be linked to the price of
the country's principal export, but shocks arising from weather
fluctuations might not be included. What this imperfection will do
is to blur the effectiveness of the state-contingency in
eliminating incentive problems. There will be some states of
nature in which the country will be unable to meet its
obligations, even though these will in principle be indexed to the
state of nature. At the margin, an improvement in the country's
ability to pay will in these states of nature benefit only the
creditors, not the country; thus the country's incentive to adjust
27will be diluted. Clearly, however, the dilution will be less if
the obligations at least somewhat reflect the state of nature than
if they do not. So an imperfect state-contingent claim is
stilibetter than a claim that is not state-contingent at all.
Debt postponement
So far we have discussed only schemes that link debt
forgiveness to either ability to pay or the state of nature.
However, the more immediate issue is one of proposals to link new
money to export revenues or export prices. Is this something
completely different, or is the analysis similar?
The essential point here is that once we are in a situation
of defensive lending by existing creditors, the creditors do not
expect to be fully repaid --nordo the debtors expect to pay
fully. Thus new money contains a concessional element, even if it
does not do so on paper. As a result, the same considerations that
apply to eventual forgiveness also apply to new money.
Consider an extension of our basic model to three periods. In
period 1 the country makes a decision about adjustment effort,
which affects maximum resource transfer in period 2; ability to
repay in period 3 is also uncertain. Then any relief from the
burden of resource transfer in period 2 will not be fully offset
28by an increase in the expected burden in period 3. Itfollows that
the incentive to adjust initially will depend on the conditions
attached to new money in period 2. If creditors will demand the
maximum possible resource transfer regardless of the state of
nature, there will be noincentive to adjust. If, on the contrary,
new lending is linked to the state of nature, so that adjustment
effort at the margin benefits the country rather than the
creditors, the incentive to adjust will be greater.
Although the analysis is highly abstract, then, we seem to be
left with a clear conclusion: linking either eventual repayment or
new money to measures of the state of nature is a good idea.
4. Concluding remarks
This paper has presented a highly abstract analysis of the
issues involved in dealing with the developing country debt
problem. I have argued that the best way to think about that
problem is as one of debt overhang: the 'tinherited debt" of some
countries is larger than the present value of the resource
transfer that their creditors expect tham to make in the future.
Much popular discussion seems to presume that the appropriate
handling of a debt problem is simply contingent on the
distinctione between liquidity and solvency. If it is a liquidity
29problem, financing should be provided until the country has worked
its way out; if it is a solvency problem, some kind of bankruptcy
procedure is called for. What even a highly abstract analysis of
the debt overhang problem shows is that this is a misleading way
to view the issue. There is no such thing as a pure liquidity
problem; it must arise because of doubts about solvency. Even if
there is a significant possibility that debt will not be repaid in
full, however, it may still be in creditors' interest to provide
enough financing to avert an immediate default. As is fairly
widely appreciated, however, there is a conflict between the
collective interest of creditors in providing financing and the
individual interest of each creditor in getting out.
The choice between financing and debt forgiveness should not,
according to the analysis presented here, hinge on some attempt to
settle the liquidity vs. solvency question. Instead, it represents
a tradeoff between the option value of a large nominal debt and
the incentive effects of a debt that is unlikely to be repaid.
Since good news is always possible, creditors would like to keep
their claims high, so that if by some chance a country should turn
out to be able to repay, they will not turn out to have forgiven
debt unnecessarily. On the other hand, if a country is not going
to be able to repay except in exceptional circumstances, it will
have little incentive to try to adjust. Thus creditors may wish to
30forgive part of a country's debt to increase the likelihood that
it will repay what remains. It is because of the tension between
these two objectives that the issue of how much to rely on debt
forgiveness and how much to rely on financing is a difficult one.
There seems to be a compelling case that the tradeoff between
forgiveness and financing can be improved by indexing repayment to
the state of nature. If paymentis linked to some measure of
conditions outside the country's control,the probability for any
given expected payment that adjustment effort will at the margin
benefit the country, not its creditors, will be increased. Thus
the analysis in this paper, abstract though it is, does suggest
that linking new money and possibly debt relief to measures of
economic conditions could be to the mutual benefit of debtors and
their creditors.
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